

The Director of Central Intelligence

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National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : Milton Kovner  
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SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Meeting: Western Europe

Greece

1. The host of last minute objections to the text of the draft US-Greek base agreement by the Greek government was attributed by most analysts to Papandreou's reluctance to have the agreement falter on the single issue of duration, and to protestations by some of his associates that the text was in many ways less advantageous to Greece than either the 1977 or 1981 draft accords. On the question of possible further Greek moves, it was generally agreed that while it was unlikely that the Greek government was prepared to concede much on the agreement's provisions for renewal, having now widened the number of issues on which differences exist it will be willing to continue the negotiating process in the hope of seeking appropriate trade-offs on outstanding issues.

Turkey

2. With the promulgation on June 13 of the election law, November 6 is set as the election date and August 25 will mark the beginning of campaigning. The consensus is that Turkey will remain politically stable during the transition to civilian rule, although some increase in terrorism can be expected. General Evren, who will become the civilian president, will remain a highly popular leader, able to retain wide support for Turkey's "guided" democracy. Initially, at least, dissent -- primarily from the intellectual elite -- will not be a problem, given the structures established by the new constitution. In the longer run, it is questionable whether political expression can be effectively contained within the centrist parties favored by Evren.

SECRET

Italy

3. Major shifts in voting patterns are unlikely in the national elections on June 26 and 27, and the most probable outcome will be a coalition again including the Christian Democrats, Republicans, Liberals, Social Democrats, along with the Socialists, whose defection in April caused the downfall of Prime Minister Fanfani's five-party cabinet. Negotiations will nevertheless be difficult, especially between Christian Democrats and Socialists, and it remains doubtful whether the main hope for a new government -- a rigorous economic policy to combat high public sector deficits, inflation, and unemployment -- can be fulfilled. Should the Socialists do poorly in the elections, their bargaining power would be reduced, but a centrist coalition without the Socialists would not have the parliamentary strength to survive for long. Should the Socialists fall far below their already reduced expectation of 12 percent of the vote, Craxi's leadership of the party could be in trouble, and the Socialist's left wing increase its influence. The Communists are not expected to show a gain in the elections. The campaign has shown evidence of considerable voter resentment of politics and politicians, and if the results confirm a high rate of absenteeism and blank ballots, it could mark a significant disenchantment with politics as usual in Italy.

"Peace" Movement

4. There is a growing mood of pessimism among "peace" activists in Western Europe about the movement's ability to influence events, notably the deployment of INF. Analysts nevertheless expect that activities planned for the fall will ensure very large demonstrations, especially in West Germany, where the opposition Social Democrats and German labor are increasingly encouraging individuals to participate. While acknowledging the prevalence of substantial anti-nuclear sentiment, most analysts believe that the numbers of people demonstrating will not reach new records and may in fact fall off next spring. Violence cannot be excluded, although it will not be promoted by "peace" movement leaders, and the public generally will not be sympathetic to civil disobedience. The greatest danger may lie in governmental "over-reaction" to incidents set off by demonstrations. Most analysts believe a Geneva agreement that sanctioned some Western deployment would thin the ranks of "peace" movement demonstrations; others believe the hard core of likely demonstrators are unlikely to be dissuaded by a US-Soviet accord.

  
Milton Kovner

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